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ABSTRACT
In his concurrence with the Supreme Court ruling in Furman v. Georgia (1972), Justice
Thurgood Marshall postulated that levels of support for capital punishment are associated
with the amount of knowledge about the death penalty process. He suggested that exposure
to information about capital punishment produces sentiments in opposition to capital
punishment except in instances for which support is based on retributive beliefs. These
notions have become known as the Marshall Hypothesis and have been empirically tested
among a variety of populations. The research presented in this thesis adds to that body of
literature by testing these ideas among a sample of students in the College of Justice and
Safety at Eastern Kentucky University. Results from a self-administered survey provide
support for two of the three hypotheses originally posited by Justice Marshall. Implications
of these findings are discussed and suggestions for future research are provided.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the Death Penalty Information Center (2019a), Americans’ support
for the death penalty is at its lowest since 1972. Nonetheless there are still more individuals
in favor (55%) of capital punishment than opposed (41%). Why do the majority of
Americans’ still support such a relic of archaic times in 2019? Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall expressed his thoughts on this question in his 1972 concurring opinion
for the Furman v. Georgia case, in which he surmised that the problem lies in the fact that
the American public was largely unaware about the death penalty in the United States. It
has been 47 years since Justice Marshall gave us what is known today as the Marshall
Hypothesis, which can be broken down into three separate hypotheses that can be tested
using empirical social science research methods. The three hypotheses are (Furman v.
Georgia, 1972):
1) Support for capital punishment is associated with the lack of knowledge about it.
2) Exposure to information about capital punishment produces sentiments in
opposition to capital punishment.
3) Exposure to information about capital punishment will have little or no impact on
those who support it for retributive reasons distinguished from instrumental
reasons.
Opponents of capital punishment may wonder how, it possible that members of
modern society, with information streaming around them at all times, are not informed
enough to recognize concerns associated with the capital punishment process. In the
United States, government is set up in a way public opinion matters a great deal, which
values populism, so it would be very difficult to put into motion the necessary means to
1

abolish the death penalty without first gauging the level of support and understanding the
reasons behind it (Bohm, 2003).
The purpose of this thesis is to put the Marshall Hypothesis to test and to explore the
underlying issues surrounding support for the death penalty by surveying Justice and Safety
college students at Eastern Kentucky University (EKU). This research will contribute to
the literature because all three of Marshall’s hypotheses are tested, which is not common
among existing studies.
THE MILESTONE CASE: FURMAN V. GEORGIA
The landmark case from which the Marshall Hypothesis stems is Furman v.
Georgia. This case began in January of 1972 and was decided in June of the same year.
The petitioner in this case, Furman, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death
after. He was burglarizing a private home when a family member happened to discover
him. Furman attempted to flee and during the process; according to him, he tripped and
fell. He claimed that the fall caused the gun he was carrying to fire, which subsequently
killed a resident of the home. The question posed in his Supreme Court case, the lead case
decided together with Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas (death penalty cases that
did not involve murder) was, "Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in
(these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments?" (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p.239) The Court ruled in a five to
four majority that yes, “…the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments” (pp.
239-240). Abnormally, each Justice decided to publish a separate opinion resulting in more
than 200 pages of their thoughts and opinions surrounding the case(s) and the ultimate
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ruling. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall believed the death penalty to be
unconstitutional in all instances while the other opinions focused on the arbitrary nature of
the imposition of death sentences, including a racial bias against black defendants. This
major decision by the Court forced the states and the national legislature to reconsider the
specific statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be
administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner. This ruling imposed a short-lived
moratorium on the death penalty, which required state and federal officials to refine their
criminal statutes in order to ensure that capital punishment would therefore not be
considered arbitrary nor discriminatory. Later to be essentially overturned by Greg v.
Georgia in 1976, when the Supreme Court ruled, “The imposition of the death penalty for
the crime of murder has a long history of acceptance both in the United States and in
England [.] At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a
common sanction in every State…” (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 176).
THE MARSHALL HYPOTHESIS
Justice Thurgood Marshall reasoned in his 1972 Furman concurrence that the American
public was largely unaware about the death penalty in the United States. In his concurring
opinion, Marshall wrote, “The question with which we must deal is not whether a
substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital
punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all
information presently available” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 362). To clarify his
explanation, Marshall further commented, “This is not to suggest that with respect to this
test of unconstitutionality people are required to act rationally; they are not. With respect
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to this judgment, a violation of the Eighth Amendment is totally dependent on the
predictable, subjective, emotional reactions of informed citizens” (p. 362).
The first element of the Marshall Hypothesis infers that support for capital
punishment is associated with a lack of knowledge about the death penalty. That specific
hypothesis was taken from the following portion of Marshall’s opinion (Furman v.
Georgia, 1972, p. 364):
…that the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life
imprisonment, that convicted murderers are rarely executed but usually
sentenced to a term in prison; that convicted murderers usually are model
prisoners, and that they almost always become law abiding citizens upon
their release from prison; that the costs of executing a capital offender
exceed the costs of imprisoning him for life; that while in prison, a convict
under sentence of death performs none of the useful functions that life
prisoners perform; that no attempt is made in the sentencing process to
ferret out likely recidivists for execution; and that the death penalty may
actually stimulate criminal activity.
The second specific hypothesis suggests that opposition to the death penalty will
increase with exposure to information about it. This element came from Marshall’s belief
that, “…this information would surely convince average citizens that the death penalty was
unwise” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 364). In the third portion of to his hypothesis,
Marshall recognized that even if American’s knew the information, which he had pointed
out with his previous two hypotheses, that they still may not consider the death penalty
morally reprehensible or opposite to primarily due to retributive reasons. It has been
established that retributivists are less likely to respond to knowledge-based claims on
matters such as the death penalty (Shafer-Landau, 1996). In his opinion, Marshall wrote,
“Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable
aspirations for a government in a free society” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 343). He went
on to say, “The history of the Eighth Amendment supports only the conclusion that
4

retribution for its own sake is improper” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 345) and that “no
one has ever seriously advanced retribution as a legitimate goal of our society” (Furman v.
Georgia, 1972, p. 363). Marshall’s view of retribution, which he equated with purposeless
vengeance, was so negative that he maintained (p. 363-364):
I cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people
would ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance. Thus, I believe that
the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the material
already considered that the death penalty is immoral and therefore
unconstitutional.
Justice Marshall’s opinion has reached a wide audience, and the originality of his
thoughts and the resulting general hypothesis has captured the attention of many social
scientists. These investigators tend to agree that, while testing Marshall’s ideas is
important, there is some uncertainty concerning what specifically Marshall meant by
“knowledge” and, therefore, how this concept should be measured so that his hypotheses
may be tested empirically. While no scale is flawless, a variety of items and composite
measures have now been used to quantify knowledge and opinions about the death penalty,
and there have been several tests of the different elements of Justice Marshall’s hypotheses.
Results of these studies, as well as a brief discussion of the history of the death penalty and
some theoretical outlooks about capital punishment in this country will be discussed in the
next chapter.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this literature review is to present a summary of what is known
about levels of support an opposition for the death penalty in America, as well as the
validity of the Marshall Hypothesis regarding capital punishment in the United States.
American support for the death penalty is a complicated matter to say the very least.
However, according to the Death Penalty Information Center (2019a), Americans’ support
for the death penalty is at its lowest since 1972; nonetheless, there are still more in favor
(55%) than opposed (41%). Why is this? Is Justice Marshall’s belief that “American
citizens know almost nothing about capital punishment” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 362)
still correct? Information and results presented in this thesis will help to answer that
question. The following sections in this literature review will summarize a brief history of
capital punishment, analyze David Garland’s thoughts on the Furman case, investigate the
ideologies associated with support or opposition to the death penalty, and consider past
studies that have tested the Marshall Hypothesis.
HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
To understand the concept of public support or opposition, I feel that we must first
consider the history of the death penalty. Garland (2010) does a great job of explaining the
historical modes of capital punishment in Peculiar Institution, including the breakdown of
the following: The Early-Modern Mode, The Modern Mode, and The Late-Modern Mode.
These eras are different from what we recognize in the United States due to the limited
period of American history. In the United States there is the “early period” which consists
of 1608 to 1929, the “premodern era” which consists of 1930 to 1967, and last the “modern
era” which began in late 1976 and early 1977 through present day (Paternoster, 1991).
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The early-modern mode covers the years of 1400 to 1700 and, during this time, the
use of capital punishment was in the form of state building to assert and preserve authority
by its leaders. The death penalty was carried out as a public spectacle of awe and terror.
The sovereign ruling elites were the only individuals able to legally enforce capital
punishment, and acting as the one great power, they were able to push religious narratives
that were used to prescribe this form of punishment in order to prove a moral duty of
performing none other than God’s work. During this period, it is important to note that
there was a lot of class stratification and demonization of criminals creating the “them”
and “us” concept, which lead to the fear in citizens of ever questioning the leader’s
decisions and thus creating minimal debate over the use of capital punishment.
During the modern mode, which ran from 1700 until the mid-1900s, history shows
some major shifts in capital punishment including the reasoning behind the use as well as
changes in the methods to which executions were carried out. The formation of nation state
stability diminished the need for and legitimacy of the death penalty so it is here where the
shift took place from performing a public spectacle to increasing state bureaucratization
which included the increased role of criminal justice actors in capital punishment in
replacement of traditional monarchies. This shift also decreased the moral justification
based on religiosity. Reasoning, however, found a new home in the form of scientifically
upholding the social contract by promoting justice and safety through a crime control
rationale. In moving away from the public spectacle, the executions were relocated from
public squares to the front gates of prisons before eventually being moved to be hidden
behind prison walls much in a fashion as they are today. The range of crimes that capital
punishment could be handed out in response to was dramatically narrowed during this
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period, but the use of the dangerous other explanation still was prevalently used against the
condemned to clear the conscious of the enforcing actors involved. These reforms
mentioned were being initiated by enlightened monarchs at the time and the forces that
drove the restructuring and abolitions being driven by democratization and populism.
Finally, the late-modern mode, or what is labelled late modernity is described as
starting in 1960 and onward to present day. During this time, capital punishment began to
be perceived as an increasingly old-fashioned and unnecessary remnant, a relic of archaic
times so to speak. Liberalism and democratization had come to a maturity and social
welfare was known as the key driving force. The snowball effects with abolition began
hitting several nations across the board with the end of World War II. The legal parameters
of capital punishment increased, and reforms began piling up transforming into what is
now recognized as super due process. It was around the late 1970s before the use of the
death penalty really started to decline in the United States. The key differences in the
United States as opposed to the other civilized Western nations is that the United States
has an incomplete process of delocalization, in that power is held at too many levels with
the possibility of local, state, and federal overreaches. Still as seen today, it has become
harder to legitimize the use of capital punishment even in the United States where close to
half the states have already abolished its use. The death penalty is supposed to be reserved
as an ultimate penalty for ultimate crimes but even then, it still does not seem to justify the
use when the extreme capitalistic nature of pharmaceutical companies is at the point of
refusing to sell the lethal injection cocktails.
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DAVID GARLANDS’ TAKE ON THE AMERICAN CLASSIC
As David Garland (2010) discussed in Peculiar Institution in Chapter Eight in
depth, he views Furman v. Georgia as an “American Classic” as it is a perfect example of
how legislation should lead and not follow. Furman was the catalyst in the way that lead
to an endless negotiation of compromise, which is how Garland defines legalism. It was a
monumental study in ambivalence and focused on procedure over substance as well as
individual narrowly defined cases as opposed to general policy. Public opinion, the leading
force of populism, was a major leading factor, and like in all matters in the United States
legal system, has developed into an immense consumption of lives and economic
resources. Garland views the Furman majority ruling as proof that the death penalty is
unconstitutional on the grounds of its use being “lawless, pointless, uncivilized, and
inhumane” (p.227). In comparison to other nations in the Western world, Garland contends
that Furman was the American equivalent to the elite-led abolition processes taking place.
The reform effort was supported by America’s national elites, argued by civil rights
litigants, and mandated by liberal elite Supreme Court justices.
Research consistent with Garland’s (2010) ideas has shown that public opinion is
influential in the retention of the death penalty in at least four ways. First, it could influence
legislators to support death penalty statutes. It can encourage some prosecutors to seek the
death penalty in cases they might normally consider a plea-bargain. In addition, it may
discourage some state officials from commuting death sentences. And finally, it might be
indirectly used by justices of the United States Supreme Court and state supreme courts as
a measure of "evolving standards of decency” regarding what constitutes "cruel and
unusual punishment” in state constitutions and under the Eighth Amendment of the United
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States Constitution (Bedau, 1987; Bohm, 1991; Furman v. Georgia, 1972; Ellsworth &
Ross, 1983).
Garland (2010) pointed out that the influence of the Furman ruling was intense and
far-reaching. A total of 587 condemned men and two women were released from death row
and given the sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole, creating a possible
new future for them. The decision invalidated all of the nation’s death penalty statutes and
nullified the existing capital law of 36 states and the District of Columbia. What had been
hoped to be the decision to create change in a major step forward in the criminal justice
system in reality only resulted in a series of reforms that were focused on the breaches of
legality thus creating super due process because death is different. One has to consider, had
Furman not been ruled the way it was, the populist backlash may not have happened and
capital punishment could have, pun intended, died on the vine.
It should be noted, however, that Garland (2010) failed to recognize the idea that
Furman is what ushered in an era that has produced nothing but endless frustration and a
colossal amount of financial burdens for victims’ relatives as well as all parties involved
in the legal process and execution of a death sentence and finally for the offenders who
have been sentenced to death with the uncertainty of their fate. It is as though that receiving
the death penalty often times is actually receiving life in prison with the ‘chance’ of death.
Garland (2010) presented what is referred to as the Furman backlash in the ninth
chapter, which covers the immense amount of criticism that came about almost
immediately from politicians, mainly republican, and other criminal justice actors (i.e.,
police officers and prosecutors). The argument was made that Furman caused a great
injustice for victims and posed problems for public safety. This was the first time in
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American history that the death penalty had become a highly politicized issue. Within the
first two years following the Furman decision, 35 states had revised and reenacted their
death penalty statutes and by the end of 1974 a total of 231 new death sentences has been
handed down.
Garland (2010) goes into three frames that form the politics of this reaction
including law and order, states’ rights, and traditional cultural values. Liberalism is often
held accountable for the violence and disorder in America in the 1960s. The banning effect
that Furman had on capital punishment can be viewed as a further extension of liberalism
in what would be considered an extreme form. The law and order frame is critical to
President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Crime” that came about in 1965. This frame was an
essential tool to laying the path for Gregg v. Georgia (1976) that would essentially overturn
the Furman v. Georgia (1972) Supreme Court ruling. The frame of states’ rights, driven
by populism, comes in as a rebuttal against the overreach of the federal government in a
counteraction against the idea of big government and a centralized power. Finally,
Garland’s third frame of traditional cultural values is a bit more multifaceted. This is where
the Republican Party’s “Southern Strategy” comes into effect which affirms what is known
as traditional values in a fundamentalist culture in light of religious principles. It may be
argued that this strategy was the way for government politicians of the South to reestablish
and pose defiance after the civil rights movement in the 1960s and in return take the largely
Democratic population of the South, whom felt betrayal at the highest level, and use that
to convert the South from a sea of blue to a flowing bright red.
With the reinstatement of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), it is not
difficult to see just how much of a populist symbol the death penalty is. The use of fear and
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resentment of political and cultural change has been attributed as a major factor in even
successfully aiding President Richard Nixon to be elected as the 37th President of the
United States. The maintenance of this order is vital because as Garland (2010) also states,
if the levels were to overreach and push boundaries on one another it would push more
legalism into the system which in return fails to accomplish anything except the possibility
of local and state lawsuits in response of the counter majoritarian decisions. The structure
of American government, which is decentralized, sets it apart from the European
governments and the way decisions such as abolishment are carried out. For instance, while
American citizens typically often get to express their opinions and vote on laws and legal
policies, European governments are more capable of imposing policies even when it is
against popular opinion. It seems, however, that the levels and branches of government
have become so divided they are easily conquered individually through vulnerability from
opportunistic politicians and their constituents. This type of politics of popular democracy
is why President Bill Clinton focused largely on public opinion polls and focus groups
before imperative decisions were made (Kiousis, 2003).
PAST STUDIES PUTTING THE MARSHALL HYPOTHESIS TO THE TEST
A review of the literature produced 29 published studies that tested one or more of
the separate hypotheses derived from Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion (Bohm, 1989,
1990; Bohm, Clark, & Aveni, 1990, 1991; Bohm & Vogel, 1991, 1994, 2004; Bohm,
Vogel, & Maisto, 1993; Boots, Mallicoat, & Wareham, 2018; Clarke, Lambert, & Whitt,
2001; Cochran & Chamlin, 2005; Cochran, Sanders, & Chamlin, 2006; Cox, 2013; Diaz &
Garza, 2015; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Falco & Freiburger, 2011; Kennedy-Kollar&
Mandery, 2010; Lambert, Camp, Clarke, & Jiang, 2011; LaChappelle, 2014; Lambert &
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Clarke, 2001; Lee, Bohm, & Pazzani, 2014; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Mallicoat &
Brown, 2008; Michel & Cochran, 2011; Sandys, 1995; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar &
Dittenhoffer, 1981; Vollum, Mallicoat, & Buffington-Vollum, 2009; Wright, Bohm, &
Jamieson, 1995). Most frequently, the subjects of these studies have been undergraduate
college students, and surveys were designed based largely off the work of Bohm and his
colleges (Bohm, 1989, 1990; Bohm et al, 1990, 1991; Bohm & Vogel, 1991, 1994, 2004;
Bohm et al., 1993). As recognized by Cochran and Chamlin (2005), the methodology
commonly consisted of three elements including: (1) a pretest measure of attitudes toward
capital punishment, (2) exposure to knowledge about capital punishment, and (3) a posttest measure of death penalty attitudes. It is noteworthy that the studies mentioned above
vary in both the quantity and quality of the exposure to capital punishment information the
subjects obtained. Despite the comparisons in methodology, these studies have a tendency
to find somewhat mixed though fairly reliable support for the three Marshall hypotheses
(Cochran & Chamlin, 2005).
In regard to the first portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis, the literature strongly
suggests that the average American citizen is both uninformed about the death penalty and
unaware of whether it achieves its desired outcomes or not (Bohm, 1987, 1989, 1998;
Bohm et al., 1990, 1991; Bohm, Vogel, & Maisto, 1993; Ellsworth & Ross 1983; Firment
& Geiselman, 1997; Lambert & Clarke, 2001; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar &
Dittenhoffer, 1981; Wright et al., 1995).
Sarat and Vidmar (1976) performed the earliest attempt to verify the second portion
of Marshall’s hypothesis, and it was followed by a much smaller Canadian study by Vidmar
and Dittenhoffer (1981). Neither of first two studies listed above focused on the issue of
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innocence nor how it may affect support for the death penalty. Although Bohm et al. (1991)
and Sandys (1995) included the matter of innocence as part of the death penalty course,
they did not test the effect of innocence alone on support for the death penalty.
Ellsworth and Gross (1994) described the third portion of Marshall’s hypothesis by
stating, “As support for the death penalty has increased, so has the willingness to endorse
retribution as a motive” (p. 29). There has been a hardening of hearts in the American
society toward perceptions of crime during the past 30 years and an increase in social
acceptance of retribution for criminal acts (Bowers, 1984; Durham, Elrod, & Kinkade,
1996). However, retribution requires that the individual in question is in fact guilty, not
innocent, in order to be punished (Lempert, 1983). Under the retributive theory, it is not
permissible to sentence an innocent person to death, predominantly in light of the fact that
the death penalty is irrevocable once the actual execution has been carried out (Gross,
1996). Unfortunately, there is increasing evidence that a substantial number of innocent
individuals have been sentenced to death (Radelet, Bedau, & Putman, 1992; Radelet,
Lofquist, & Bedau, 1996; Weinstock & Schwartz, 1998).
Table 1 is a summary of previous studies testing the Marshall Hypothesis. As
discussed many of these studies involved a pre- and post-test design, using a death penalty
class as the stimulus. But, as shown in the table, many studies did not test all three
hypotheses. The majority of the findings do show support for the Marshall Hypothesis.
When limited support is found, the overall results still tend to support hypotheses but there
was not always support among the subgroups or individual items on the scale. In some
cases (e.g., Kennedy-Kollar & Mandery, 2010), there was no statistical change in levels of
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support after subjects had been presented with information about capital punishment, but
there were, for some reason, decreases in levels of opposition for the death penalty.

Table 1: Support of the Marshall Hypotheses from Previous Studies*
Key Findings

Sample
Size

M. Hyp. 1

M. Hyp. 2

M. Hyp. 3

Sarat & Vidmar (1976)

181

Support

Support

Support

Lord et al. (1979)

48

---

---

---

Vidmar & Dittenhoffer (1981)

39

Support

Support

---

Ellsworth & Ross (1983)

500

Support

---

---

Bohm (1989)

50

---

Support

---

Bohm (1990)

109

---

Support

---

Bohm et al. (1990)

71

---

No

---

Bohm et al. (1991)

272

Support

Limited

Support

Bohm & Vogel (1991)

105

---

Support

Support

Bohm et al. (1993)

106

---

Support

---

Bohm & Vogel (1994)

222

---

Support

---

Sandys (1995)

23

---

Support

---

Wright et al. (1995)

106

Support

No

---

Clarke et al. (2001)

730

---

Limited

---

Lambert & Clarke (2001)

730

---

Limited

---

Bohm & Vogel (2004)

69

---

Support

---

Cochran & Chamlin (2005)

70

Support

Support

No

Cochran et al. (2006)

365

Support

Support

---

Mallicoat & Brown (2008)

340

---

Support

---

Vollum et al. (2009)

927

---

Limited

Support

Kennedy-Kollar & Mandery (2010)

187

---

No

---

Falco & Freiburger (2011)

20

---

No

---

Michel & Cochran (2011)

365

Support

Support

Support

Author(s) & Date Published
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Table 1 (continued)
Key Findings

Sample
Size

M. Hyp. 1

M. Hyp. 2

Lambert et al. (2011)

730

---

Support

---

Cox (2013)

362

Support

No

---

LaChappelle (2014)

216

---

Support

---

Lee et al. (2014)

338

Support

Support

No

Diaz & Garza (2015)

481

---

Limited

---

Boots et al. (2018)

203

---

No

---

Author(s) & Date Published

M. Hyp. 3

*This table is a modification and expansion of the a table presented by Cochran (2017)
IDEOLOGIES ASSOCIATED WITH OPINIONS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY
In general, there are not any universal explanations for public support or opposition
concerning the use of the death penalty. Research confirms the assumption that death
penalty perceptions and attitudes are often grounded in an emotional response rather than
based on any evidentiary support (Bohm, 1989, 2011; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Firment &
Geiselman, 1997; Lambert, Pasupuleti, & Allen, 2005; Roberts, 1984; Tyler & Weber,
1982; Vandiver, Giacopassi, & Gathje, 2002; Vollum, Longmire, & Buffington-Vollum,
2004). Studies have established that individuals who support the death penalty can
commonly be categorized into the three primary philosophies including deterrence,
retribution, and incapacitation (Bohm, 1992, 2011; Lambert, Camp, Clarke, & Jiang, 2011;
Lambert, Clarke, & Lambert, 2004). Deterrence refers to the method of hoping the
punishment of one criminal will persuade the offender themselves and other citizens who
witness the punishment to conform to the rules of law. There is a vast amount empirical
evidence that demonstrates the death penalty has little or no deterrent effect on violent
crime, even when adding murder to the equation (Archer, Gartner, & Beittel, 1983; Bailey,
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1974, 1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1980, 1983, 1990, 1991; Bailey &
Peterson, 1989; Decker & Kohfeld, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990; Lempert, 1983;
Paternoster, 1991; Radelet & Akers, 1996; Waldo, 1981; Steiker & Steiker, 2017; Waldo
& Myers, 2019). In the 1970s, during the get tough on crime era, deterrence was a common
reason provided for supporting the death penalty. Subsequently, the idea of retribution and
closure has become more socially acceptable (Fox, Radelet, & Bonsteel, 1991; Kort-Butler
& Ray, 2019). Retribution refers to a type of revenge which is actually one of the oldest
forms of punishment going back to an “eye for an eye” or a “life for a life” ideology and
the perception of achieving ultimate justice (Bohm, 1992; Lambert et al., 2004; Lambert,
Hogan, Moore, Jenkins, Jiang, & Clarke, 2008). And finally, incapacitation as a philosophy
suggests that individuals who have been convicted of a crime as heinous as murder in
capital cases should be executed to prevent them from killing again therefore protecting
future hypothetical victims (Lambert et al., 2004; Marquart & Sorenson, 1989). Also,
incorrectly embedded in the notion of incapacitation is the assumption that sentencing an
offender to life imprisonment is more expensive than executing carrying out an execution
(Robinson, 2009).
On the opposite end of the spectrum, there are four different philosophies identified
for being given by individuals who oppose the death penalty which are comprised of the
mercy or ethic of care, unfair administration, brutalization of society, and the possibility of
innocence such as in the case of wrongful convictions (Hood, 2001; Lambert et al., 2004;
Unnever & Cullen, 2005). Mercy, or ethic of care, refers to the idea that showing
compassion to offenders is the most important factor as opposed to revenge (Hood, 2001).
Furthermore, mercy can also be linked to the belief that the death penalty is a demonstration
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of cruelty being carried out (Vandiver et al., 2002). Unfair administration goes back to
what statistics obviously prove, if a defendant is a person of color then they are
disproportionally affected by the death penalty, both in race of the offender and race of the
victim in capital cases (Baumgartner, De Beof, & Boydstun, 2008; DPIC, 2019b). And,
finally, to look at the ideology of innocence is to understand that the justice system is not
perfect and can make mistakes like in the case of wrongful convictions. For example,
organizations such as the Innocence Project have been able to overturn sentences based on
DNA testing, new evidence, or the discovery of a false witness testimony (Whitt, Clarke,
& Lambert, 2002; Unnever & Cullen, 2005). According to the Innocence Project’s website
(2019), since 1989, when the first DNA exoneration took place, there have been 365
exonerations to date.
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METHODOLOGY
As discussed in the previous chapter, a review of the literature produced 29
published studies that tested at least some elements of the Marshall Hypothesis. The main
purpose of this research is to test all three of Marshall’s hypotheses using data from a crosssectional survey of students in the College of Justice and Safety at EKU students based on
a self-administered survey in an attempt to answer the following research questions:
1. Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU generally support or
oppose the death penalty?
2. Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU lack knowledge about
the death penalty and its effects?
3. Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU that are knowledgeable
about the death penalty generally oppose it?
4. Is knowledge about capital punishment associated with levels of support for the
death penalty among the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU
regardless of levels of belief in retribution as a basis for support for the death
penalty?
STUDY PARTICIPANTS
All students 18 years of age or older who were enrolled in at least one traditional
or online undergraduate or graduate course offered by the College of Justice and Safety
during the Spring 2019 term were eligible to participate in this cross-sectional survey. After
receiving project approval from the Institutional Review Board at EKU, eligible
participants were sent an invitation to participate in the anonymous web-based survey via
their EKU student email addresses. The invitation contained standard informed consent
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information, as well as a hotlink that routed them directly to the online survey if they chose
to participate (see Appendix A). Upon clicking the survey link, participants were asked to
verify that they were over the age of 18. If anyone would have indicated they were not at
least 18 years of age, they would have been routed away from the survey to a page
containing a statement of eligibility for participation. When potential participants verified
they were at least 18 years old, they were taken to the survey.
Email invitations were sent to 2321 students via SurveyMonkey collector emails,
and two survey reminders were sent at one week intervals after the initial invitation. There
were 211 usable responses when the survey closed. The response rate of just under 10
percent is not uncommon for web surveys, and research has established that results can be
dependable with complete and quality responses (Van Mol, 2017). As shown in Table 2,
there was a relatively even split between male (49.3%) and female (50.7%) respondents.
The vast majority (90.0%) of respondents were white, and their ages ranged from 18 to 66,
with an average of 28.58. More than half of respondents were between 18 and 23. The
moderate category was chosen most (41.6%) and very liberal was chosen least (3.8%). The
majority of students identified themselves as somewhat religious (52.6%). There was a
close to even split between Campus 1 (traditional on-ground) students (57.6%) and Campus
2 (exclusively online classes) students (42.4%). Most respondents were declared as
Criminal Justice (28.4%) majors working on their bachelor’s degree. Generally, the
respondents reported not being afraid of becoming a victim of a violent crime (55.5%).
When asked about their immediate family members (i.e. mother, father, siblings)
supporting the death penalty, the vast majority of students selected yes that they did

20

(79.7%). Finally, most respondents indicated that a close friend or family member or they
had never been a victim of a violent crime (60.5%).
Table 2: Participant Demographics and Personal Experiences
n

Valid %

Gender:
Female
Male

107
104

50.7
49.3

Race:
White
Other

189
21

90
10

Age:
18-23
24-66

112
98

53.3
46.7

Political Views:
Very Liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very Conservative

8
38
87
62
14

3.8
18.2
41.6
29.7
6.7

Religious Views:
Very Religious
Somewhat Religious
Not Religious

35
110
64

16.7
52.6
30.6

Campus:
Campus 1 (Traditional On-Ground Classes)
Campus 2 (ExclusivelyOnline Courses)

121
89

57.6
42.4

Degree Type:
Corrections & Juvenile Justice Studies (BS)
Criminal Justice (BS)
Criminology & Criminal Justice (MS)
Police Studies (BS)
Social Justice Studies (BS)

1
60
15
2
2

0.5
28.4
7.1
0.9
0.9
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Table 2 (continued)
n

Valid%

Justice, Policy & Leadership (MS)
Emergency Medical Care (AS)
Emergency Medical Care (BS)
Fire, Arson & Explosion Investigation (BS)
Fire Protection Administration (BS)
Fire Protection & Safety Engineering Technology (BS)
Homeland Security (BS)
Occupational Safety (BS)
Safety, Security & Emergency Management (MS)
Other Graduate Major
Double Major

8
5
12
11
3
11
21
22
26
2
10

3.8
2.4
5.7
5.2
1.4
5.2
10
10.4
12.3
0.9
4.7

SJS Major:
Yes
No

96
115

45.5
54.5

How afraid are you of becoming a victim of a violent crime?
Very Afraid
Somewhat Afraid
Not Afraid

14
80
117

6.6
37.9
55.5

Do most of your immediate family members (i.e. mother, father, siblings) support
the death penalty?
Yes
110
79.7
No
28
20.3
Have you or a close friend/family member ever been a victim of a violent crime?
Yes
No

83
127

39.5
60.5

MEASURES
Other items in the survey were modeled after those used by Bohm et al. (1991) in
their test of the Marshall Hypothesis and were grouped into three sections. The first section
of the survey contained four items intended to gauge participants’ support or opposition
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for the death penalty. Respondents were asked to respond using a seven-point Likert scale
(strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, agree, strongly agree)
see Appendix B, Table B1 for initial aggregate responses for these items. The original
response scale for these items was then modified by removing the neutral responses and
recoding responses from the other six options into the two categories of support or oppose.
These four items were then combined (α = .770) to create a composite measure to represent
overall opinions about the death penalty. A summary of responses to each of these items,
as well as those described below, are presented in the next chapter.
The second section of the survey, also modeled after those used by Bohm et al.
(1991), contained fourteen items intended to gauge participants’ knowledge of the death
penalty. Respondents were asked to respond using true or false for the statements given
See Appendix B, Table B2 for initial aggregate responses for these items. A summary of
responses of each of these items, are presented in the next chapter.
The third section of the survey, also modeled after those used by Bohm et al. (1991),
contained eight items intended to gauge participants’ retributive nature in regard to the
death penalty. Respondents were asked to respond using a seven-point Likert scale
(strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, agree, strongly agree)
see Appendix B, Table B3 for initial aggregate responses for these items. A summary of
responses of each of these items, are presented in the next chapter.
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RESULTS
This chapter contains the results of the analyses from data collected from acrosssectional survey of the general population of College of Justice and Safety. Findings are
presented under each applicable research question. The next chapter includes a discussion
of this research, its limitations, and suggestions for future research in this area.
Research Question No. 1: Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU
generally support or oppose the death penalty?
Table 3 contains results for items measuring support for the death penalty in
general.

While the majority of respondents supported the death penalty for some

defendants convicted of first-degree murder (77.5%) and indicated that, as a juror, they
could convict a defendant that would automatically be sentenced to death if convicted
(60.4%), fewer than half of survey participants said they could pull the lever that would
result in death (47.3%) or supported the death penalty for all persons convicted of firstdegree murder (43.1%). Descriptive statistics for the composite measure created from
these four items suggest that, overall, about half the respondents support (51.5%) the death
penalty while the other half (48.5%) oppose it.

Table 3: Items Measuring Support for the Death Penalty
n

Valid %

I support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of first-degree murder.
Opposed
132
56.9
Support
100
43.1
I support the death penalty for SOME people convicted of first-degree murder.
Opposed
54
22.5
Support
186
77.5
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Table 3 (continued)
n

Valid%

If I served on a jury in a trial where the defendant, if found guilty, would
automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that defendant.
Opposed
82
Support
125

39.6
60.4

If asked to do it, I could pull the lever that would result in the death of an
individual convicted of first-degree murder.
Opposed
118
Support
106

52.7
47.3

Total Support/Opposed Scale: Determined Support by if participant agreed with
three or four of the items, and determined Opposed if participant disagreed with
at least two items. (α = .770)
Opposed
82
48.5
Support
87
51.5
A z-test for differences in proportions was also conducted to compare results among
the items. The support scale which indicates that the level of support for the statement “I
support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of first-degree murder.” was
significantly less than the statements “I support the death penalty for SOME people
convicted of first-degree murder” (p = .000) and “If I served on a jury in a trial where the
defendant, if found guilty, would automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that
defendant.” (p = .007).
Results for the first research question show that approximately half of the
participants supported the death penalty when looking at the overall scale (51.5%). When
considering the second item “I support the death penalty for SOME people convicted of
first-degree murder.” a vast majority of participants supported the death penalty (77.5%).
Finally, when looking at the first item “I support the death penalty for ALL persons
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convicted of first-degree murder.” even less than half participants supported the death
penalty (43.1%). Interestingly, students majoring within the School of Justice Studies (e.g.,
Criminal Justice, Police Studies, Corrections and Juvenile Justice, Social Justice) were
significantly (χ2 = 15.554, p = .000) more likely to oppose (66.7%) the death penalty as
compared to students with majors from other departments and colleges (34.2%).
Research Question No. 2: Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU
lack knowledge about the death penalty and its effects?
This research question was modeled after the first hypothesis used by Bohm et al.
(1991) to explore part of Justice Marshall’s first hypotheses regarding support for capital
punishment being associated with the lack of knowledge about it. Results for the 14
individual death penalty knowledge items are available in Appendix B, Table B2. Total
scores for the knowledge of the death penalty portion of the survey ranged from five to 14,
with an average of 10.60 out of 14, which equates to a C in college level courses (75.71%).
Only 11.8 percent of respondents received a “failing” score by answering 8 or fewer items
correctly. Two knowledge items had a higher percentage of being answered incorrectly.
The first was, “The majority of Americans currently favor the death penalty.” which is a
true statement although 42.3 percent of respondents thought it should be false. The second
was, “On average, the death penalty costs the tax payer less than life imprisonment.” which
is a false statement although 38.6 percent of respondents thought it should be true.
When examining the knowledge items we found that the results of the study provide
us with the information that a significance was found when comparing the scores of School
of Justice Studies majors (𝑥̅ = 11.19) to non-majors (𝑥̅ = 10.15), the School of Justice
Studies majors scoring higher (t = -4.64, p = .000) (Table 4).
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Table 4: Knowledge Comparison between SJS Majors v. Non-Majors
n
94
111

SJS Majors
Non-Majors

Mean
11.19
10.15

Standard
Deviation
1.505
1.780

Results from a one-way ANOVA indicated that there were significant (F = 2.665,
p = .034) differences in mean levels of knowledge based on political views. Post hoc
analysis revealed the only categorical difference was between participants that identified
as moderates (𝑥̅ = 10.89) and participants that identified as conservatives (𝑥̅ = 10.03) with
moderates having slightly higher knowledgably than conservatives. None of the other
analyses using individual characteristics showed a significant difference between the
categories or experiences relating to the sample and their level of knowledge (Table 5).
Table 5: Knowledge Comparison between Political Views
n
Mean
Standard Deviation
Very Liberal
8
11.25
0.886
Liberal
38
10.82
1.768
Moderate
85
10.89
1.746
Conservative
59
10.03
1.761
Very Conservative
13
10.69
1.437
Total Sample
203
10.63
1.742

Research Question No. 3: Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU
that are knowledgeable about the death penalty generally oppose it?
This research question was modeled after Justice Marshall’s second hypothesis
regarding whether exposure to information about capital punishment produces sentiments
in opposition to capital punishment. For this hypothesis, the data regarding support (see
Table B1) was used to garner if in fact opposition increased as knowledge increased (see
Appendix B, Table B2).
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Table 6 contains results for items measuring knowledge versus support comparison.
Data show that those who were opposed had significantly higher scores on the knowledge
scale for two of the individual items as well as the total support/opposed scale. Regarding
the total support/opposed scale, respondents who were opposed to the death penalty scored
an average of 11.1 out of 14 and those who supported the death penalty scored an average
of 10.4 out of 14.
Table 6: Knowledge versus Support Comparison
Standard
n
Mean
t
Sig.
Deviation
I support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of first-degree murder.
Opposed
114
11.04
1.615
3.733
.000
Support
83
10.13
1.793
I support the death penalty for SOME people convicted of first-degree murder.
Opposed
48
10.9
1.7
1.143
.255
Support
155
10.5
1.7
If I served on a jury in a trial where the defendant, if found guilty, would
automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that defendant.
Opposed
67
11
1.6
2.286
Support
108
10.4
1.6

.023

If asked to do it, I could pull the lever that would result in the death of an
individual convicted of first-degree murder.
Opposed
95
10.9
1.7
1.397
.164
Support
87
10.5
1.6
Total Support/Opposed Scale: Determined Support by if participant agreed with
three or four of the items, and determined Opposed if participant disagreed with
at least two items. (alpha = .770)
Opposed
70
11.1
1.6
2.749
.007
Support
77
10.4
1.6

While the scores associated with knowledge were higher for each item, there was
only a significant difference for “I support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of
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first-degree murder.” and “If I served on a jury in a trial where the defendant, if found
guilty, would automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that defendant.” as well
as the overall scale “Total Support/Opposed Scale: Determined Support by if participant
agreed with three or four of the items, and determined Opposed if participant disagreed
with at least two items.”
The analysis ran on the data collected from the survey response does provide
support for the second portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis.
Research Question No. 4: Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU
that are knowledgeable about the death penalty change their position of support or
opposition in regard to the degree of retribution?
This research question was modeled after Justice Marshall’s third hypothesis
regarding exposure to information about capital punishment will have little or no impact
on those who support it for retributive reasons. To examine the effect that retribution has
on each attitudinal variable, a multivariate binary logistic regression was ran for each of
the support items as well as the overall attitude towards the death penalty scale. Results
from these individual items were combined to form an additive index ranging from 8 to 56
(α = .796). Once removing the “neutral” responses (leaving 74 valid responses) the mean
ended up being approximately 28.07.
Binary Logistic Regression
Binary logistic regression was conducted to examine how individual
characteristics/experiences, death penalty knowledge, and retributive sentiments can be
used to predict whether respondents would support or oppose the death penalty. To
determine total support versus opposition of the death penalty, if a participant at least
slightly agreed with three or four of the items in the death penalty support scale, they were
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considered in support (1), and if a participant at least slightly disagreed with at least two
items they were considered in opposition (0) (see Appendix B, Table B1). Two initial
models were constructed based on the two elements—death penalty knowledge and
retributive sentiments—mentioned in Marshall’s third hypothesis. The first of these
models regressed the dichotomous support variable on only one predictor, which was
knowledge about the death penalty. The model was significant (χ2 = 7.488, p = .006),
explained 6.6 percent of the variance in support for the death penalty, and, as expected,
participants were significantly less likely to be classified as supporters as knowledge
increased (Exp(B) = .749, wald = 6.944, p = .008). For the second model, belief in
retribution was added as a predictor. This model was also significant (χ2 = 59.547, p =
..000), and explained 44.4 percent of the variation in support for capital punishment.
Additionally, as belief in retribution increased, individuals were significantly more likely
to be in support of the death penalty (Exp(B) = 1.118, wald = 32.356, p= .000). Further,
as Marshall hypothesized, knowledge was no longer a significant predictor (wald = 2.353,
p = .125) of support once the retribution scale was added. When considering only these
two items, Justice Marshall was correct based on results from this sample. However, it is
possible that other factors based on individual characteristics and experiences may serve
as significant predictor variables along with knowledge and retributive sentiments.
Consequently, three more models were created (see Table 7), each of which explained more
variation in death penalty support than the previous two models.
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Table 7: Total Support Scale/Composite, Binary Logistic Regression
Individual
Characteristics/
Experiences

Individual
Characteristics/
Experiences with
Death Penalty
Knowledge

Individual
Characteristics/Experiences
with Death Penalty
Knowledge and Retribution

Wald

Sig.

Exp(B)

Wald

Sig.

Exp(B)

Wald

Sig.

Exp(B)

6.357
1.912

.012
.167

4.807
3.33

7.336
2.59

.007
.108

7.254
4.735

6.194
1.077

.013
.299

8.545
3.271

0.411

.814

---

0.09

.956

---

0.005

.998

---

1.762

.184

2.919

2.27

.132

3.83

2.277

.131

5.203

0.426

.514

0.968

0.816

.366

0.953

1.388

.239

0.929

2.369

.668

---

2.006

.735

---

1.344

.854

---

0.557

.455

0.639

0.854

.355

0.549

0.643

.423

0.555

0.662

.718

---

0.556

.757

---

0.973

.615

---

2.943

.086

0.153

3.08

.079

0.121

1.623

.203

0.173

0.745

.689

---

0.207

.902

---

0.015

.992

---

0.933

.334

0.536

0.152

.697

0.759

1.685

.194

0.328

Knowledge
Scale

---

---

---

6.935

.008

0.583

5.458

.019

0.589

Retribution
Scale

---

---

---

---

---

---

10.282

0.001

1.17

Gender
Race
Fear of
Violent
Crime
Family
Support of
Death Penalty
Age
Political
Views
Friend/Family
Member Has
been Victim
Religion
Online v. On
Ground
Degree Type
SJS Major
(Yes or No)

Model
Information
Nagelkerke R
Square

(ꭓ2 = 44.762,
p = .000)

(ꭓ2 = 50.621,
p = .000)

(ꭓ2 = 63.801,
p = .000)

.493

.555

.657
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The first model contained only variables based on individual characteristics and
experiences. The overall model was significant (ꭓ2 = 44.762, p = .000) and explained about
50 percent of the variation. Factors such as political views, fear of crime, age, and most
other individual characteristics/experiences were not significant. Gender was the only
individual characteristic that was significant (p = .012) in the model. Consistent with
previous studies, males were almost five times more likely than females to support death
penalty.
The death penalty knowledge scale was added for the second model. This model
was also significant (ꭓ2 = 50.621, p = .000) and explained about 55.5 percent of the
variance. Again, no individual characteristics/experiences aside from gender were
significant. As in the first model, males were significantly more likely than females to
support the death penalty. Knowledge of the death penalty was also significant (p = .008);
respondents were less likely to support the death penalty as scores on the knowledge scale
increased.
The retributive scale was added for the third model. This model was also significant
(ꭓ2 = 63.801, p = .000) and explained 65.7 percent of the variance, the most of the three
models. Gender and knowledge were still significant in the same direction and the scale
measuring retribution was significant (p = .001) as well. As expected, higher scores on the
retributive scale were associated with support of the death penalty. The final model shows
that when controlling for all individual characteristics/experiences, both knowledge and
retribution are significant correlates of support/opposition.
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DISCUSSION
Research for this thesis tested four research questions regarding the death penalty
and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s hypotheses in his Furman (1972) decision. While many
studies have tested these hypotheses using a pretest/posttest method, data for this research
came from a cross-sectional online survey that took a single snapshot glance into the
opinions, characteristics, and death penalty knowledge of College of Justice and Safety
students at EKU. This research also contributes to the literature because all three of
Marshall’s hypotheses were tested, which is not common among existing studies. Perhaps
most importantly, the research presented in this thesis considers individual characteristics
and experiences, in addition to factors mentioned by Marshall, as predictors of support for
death penalty.
With regard to the first research question “Do the students of the College of Justice
and Safety at EKU generally support or oppose the death penalty?” the study provided us
with the results that over half (51.5%) of students surveyed do in fact support the death
penalty. This result is comparable to the National average according to the Death Penalty
Information Center (2019a), with more individuals in favor (55%) of capital punishment
than opposed (41%). Some studies have found greater support for the death penalty among
criminal justice majors (Farnworth, Longmire, & West, 1998; Lambert et al., 2008) while
other studies have reported no significant difference between criminal justice majors and
non-criminal justice majors (Robbers, 2004; Schadt & DeLisi, 2007). When breaking down
findings for support between the majors and non-majors within the School, results show
that majors are significantly more likely to oppose the death penalty (majors: 66.7%,
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nonmajors: 34.2%) and nonmajors were more likely to support the death penalty
(nonmajors: 65.8%, majors: 33.3%).
The second research question, “Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety
at EKU lack knowledge about the death penalty and its effects?” measures the first portion
of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis. Total scores for the knowledge of the death penalty
portion of the survey ranged from five to 14, with an average of 10.60 out of 14, which
equates to a C grade on a standard grading scale (75.71%). When comparing death penalty
knowledge, results show School of Justice Studies majors had significantly higher average
scores on the overall knowledge scale. In Bohm et al. (1991)’s study, it is noteworthy to
mention that School of Justice Studies majors scored an average of 79.9 percent with nonmajors scoring an average of 72.5 percent compared to Bohm et al. (1991) scoring an
average 79 percent after the course had been completed (54% on the pretest). When
comparing the results to a more recent study, conducted by Lee et al. (2014), they were
drastically higher than the scores averaged on both their experimental group who had taken
the course (58.8%) as well as the comparison group who had not completed the course
(38.5%). Results of this study indicate that, on average, these participants were relatively
knowledge about the death penalty. Therefore, there was not support Justice Marshall’s
first hypothesis among this sample of students.
The third research question, “Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety
at EKU that are knowledgeable about the death penalty generally oppose it?” measures
the second portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis. By looking at the overall scale (as
shown in Table 6) students who opposed the death penalty did score higher on the
knowledge portion of the survey (79.3%) than those who supported the death penalty
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(74.3%). The results of my study provided direct support for the second portion of Justice
Marshall’s hypothesis.
The fourth research question, “Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety
at EKU that are knowledgeable about the death penalty change their position of support
or opposition in regard to the degree of retribution?” measures the second portion of
Justice Marshall’s hypothesis. When considering only knowledge and retribution, the
results do provide support for this portion of the hypothesis. However, there is not support
for this hypothesis when controlling for individual characteristics and experiences. When
controlling for factors such as gender and race, knowledge is still a significant predictor of
support for the death penalty. When adding in controls for levels of belief in retribution,
knowledge is still a significant predictor of support for the death penalty.
In general, results of this study provide some support for two of the three
hypotheses defined by Justice Marshall. The first portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis
states the public lacks knowledge regarding the death penalty. Findings presented here
indicate that, on average, these participants were relatively knowledge about the death
penalty. The second portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis states that individuals who
are knowledgeable about the death penalty generally oppose it. Consistent with many other
studies testing this hypothesis (Bohm, 1989; 1990; Bohm & Vogel, 1991; 1994; 2004;
Bohm et al., 1993; Cochran & Chamlin, 2005; Cochran et al., 2006; LaChappelle, 2014;
Lambert et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2014; Mallicoat & Brown, 2008; Michel & Cochran, 2011;
Sandys, 1995; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, 1981), results of this study
provide direct support for the statement. The third portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis
states that individuals who are knowledgeable about the death penalty change their position
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of support or opposition in regard to the degree of retribution. Several studies have
produced support for this postulation (Bohm & Vogel, 1991; Bohm et al., 1991; Michel &
Cochran, 2011; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vollum et al., 2009), but findings from this sample
yielded mixed support for this idea in that the hypothesis was supported only when
examining those two factors; however; it did not hold true when controlling for individual
characteristics and experiences.
As with any research project, there are limitations that should be discussed. The
target population for this study was students enrolled in courses offered by the College of
Justice and Safety at EKU; findings do not represent the population of all EKU students or
the American public, which was the subject of Justice Marshall’s discussion. It would be
interesting to replicate this study among all EKU students to see, for example, if and how
levels of knowledge and opinions about the death penalty differ between physics majors
and students majoring within the School of Justice Studies. Also, the survey did not include
items measuring whether participants had ever taken a death penalty class or been enrolled
in a course in which a specific section was dedicated to discussing the death penalty. This
information could be an important mediating variable for levels of knowledge about the
death penalty.
Many different measures and research designs (e.g., the pre/post-test design around
a death penalty course) have been used to gauge opinions and knowledge about the death
penalty. While the measures used this study were based on those used in prior research and
had good statistical reliability with this sample, it is almost impossible to create perfect
indicators of true attitudes and opinions.
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Another limitation would be that the response rate came in just under 10 percent.
While is not uncommon for web surveys, and research has established that results can be
dependable with complete and quality responses (Van Mol, 2017), it is still limiting to the
external validity and generalization of results. And last it is important to know that with
study being a cross-sectional design we aren’t to conclude that knowledge causes
opposition.
It is important to continue researching all of Justice Marshall’s ideas, especially
among college students, some of whom will become lawmakers and, all of whom, if they
are American citizens, have or will have the opportunity to vote on laws and policy.
Populism often appeals to ordinary people who may be uninformed when it comes to the
facts. Knowledge about an issue can only lead to more informed decisions, and given the
many controversies that surround capital punishment in the United States, it is important
to continue to use empirical data to educate citizens about issues so that they may make
cognizant decisions as they cast their ballots.
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Table B1: Support Items
n
Valid %
I support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of first-degree murder.
Strongly Disagree
51
19.8
Disagree
47
18.2
Slightly Disagree
34
13.2
Neutral
26
10.1
Slightly Agree
43
16.7
Agree
33
12.8
Strongly Agree
24
9.3
I support the death penalty for SOME people convicted of first-degree murder.
Strongly Disagree
26
10.1
Disagree
17
6.6
Slightly Disagree
11
4.3
Neutral
18
7
Slightly Agree
47
18.2
Agree
82
31.8
Strongly Agree
57
22.1
If I served on a jury in a trial where the defendant, if found guilty, would
automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that defendant.
Strongly Disagree
37
Disagree
22
Slightly Disagree
21
Neutral
51
Slightly Agree
29
Agree
58
Strongly Agree
38

14.5
8.6
8.2
19.9
11.3
22.7
14.8

If asked to do it, I could pull the lever that would result in the death of an
individual convicted of first-degree murder.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Slightly Disagree
Neutral
Slightly Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

71
30
15
34
35
36
35

59

27.7
11.7
5.9
13.3
13.7
14.1
13.7

Table B2: Knowledge Items
n
Valid %
The death penalty has been abolished by a majority of Western European
Nations. (T)
True
191
88
False
26
12
Over the years, states that had the death penalty have shown lower murder rates
than neighboring states that did not have the death penalty. (F)
True
41
18.9
False
176
81.1
Studies have not found that abolishing the death penalty has any significant effect
on the murder rate in a state. (T)
True
139
64.7
False
76
35.3
Studies have shown that murder rates usually drop in the weeks following a wellpublicized execution. (F)
True
66
30.8
False
148
69.2
The average prison term served by someone sentenced to life imprisonment is less
than 10 years. (F)
True
48
22.2
False
168
77.8
Poor people who commit murder are more likely to be sentenced to death than
rich people. (T)
True
192
89.3
False
23
10.7
After the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in 1972, the murder rate
in the U.S. showed a sharp upturn. (F)
True
75
35.2
False
138
64.8
On average, the death penalty costs the taxpayer less than life imprisonment. (F)
True
83
38.6
False
132
61.4

60

Currently, there are over one thousand people awaiting execution in the United
States. (T)
True
176
82.2
False
38
17.8
The punishment of death has typically been imposed in only a small fraction of
the cases where it is an authorized punishment. (T)
True
189
87.5
False
27
12.5
The majority of Americans currently favor the death penalty. (T)
True
91
False
124

42.3
57.7

Even when convicted of similar crimes, men have been more likely to be executed
than women. (T)
True
210
97.2
False
6
2.8
Currently, the leadership of organized religion in the United States (whether
Catholic, Jewish, or Protestant) has abandoned its traditional support of (or
silence on) the death penalty and instead favors its complete abolition. (T)
True
151
69.9
False
65
30.1
The majority of executions in the United States take place in the South. (T)
True
False

187
30

61

86.2
13.8

Table B3: Retribution Items
n

Valid %

If a murderer is not executed for the crime, the friends or family of the victim are
likely to take it upon themselves to seek revenge.
Strongly Disagree
20
9.4
Disagree
80
37.6
Slightly Disagree
18
8.5
Neutral
32
15
Slightly Agree
37
17.4
Agree
21
9.9
Strongly Agree
5
2.3
The very worst of the Nazi war criminals should have been executed for their
"crimes against humanity."
Strongly Disagree
9
4.2
Disagree
16
7.5
Slightly Disagree
12
5.6
Neutral
13
6.1
Slightly Agree
31
14.6
Agree
52
24.4
Strongly Agree
80
37.6
Those who take a life should forfeit their own in return.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Slightly Disagree
Neutral
Slightly Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

23
41
36
43
36
20
12

10.9
19.4
17.1
20.4
17.1
9.5
5.7

Killing is all right if the right people do it and think they have a good reason for
doing it.
Strongly Disagree
58
27.2
Disagree
54
25.4
Slightly Disagree
27
12.7
Neutral
33
15.5
Slightly Agree
22
10.3
Agree
13
6.1
Strongly Agree
6
2.8
62

Members of society have a right to get revenge when a very serious crime like
murder has been committed.
Strongly Disagree
57
26.8
Disagree
67
31.5
Slightly Disagree
18
8.5
Neutral
30
14.1
Slightly Agree
23
10.8
Agree
12
5.6
Strongly Agree
6
2.8
Sometimes I have felt a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer was
sentenced to a penalty less than death.
Strongly Disagree
33
15.5
Disagree
48
22.5
Slightly Disagree
13
6.1
Neutral
35
16.4
Slightly Agree
37
17.4
Agree
36
16.9
Strongly Agree
11
5.2
There are some murderers whose death would give me a sense of personal
satisfaction.
Strongly Disagree
32
Disagree
45
Slightly Disagree
11
Neutral
43
Slightly Agree
27
Agree
35
Strongly Agree
20

15
21.1
5.2
20.2
12.7
16.4
9.4

An execution would make me sad, regardless of the crime the individual
committed.
Strongly Disagree
18
Disagree
53
Slightly Disagree
24
Neutral
42
Slightly Agree
36
Agree
32
Strongly Agree
8

8.5
24.9
11.3
19.7
16.9
15
3.8
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